

# FACKENHEIM AND THE HOLOCAUST: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

MICHAEL L. MORGAN

Emil Fackenheim died in Jerusalem early Friday morning, September 19, 2003, at the age of eighty-seven. His intellectual career, if we date its beginning to his entering the Hochschule<sup>1</sup> in Berlin in 1935, spanned sixty-eight years. People think of him as a Jewish theologian and philosopher and, especially, as one of the few Jewish theologians who was preoccupied with the Holocaust as a — in fact, *the* — momentous event for contemporary Jewish life and for Judaism today. As we look back over his career, it is probably not inaccurate to see the Holocaust as its core and to regard his post-Holocaust writings as his most important contribution and legacy. But our understanding of that legacy is hardly precise and clear. Indeed, many widely held views about Fackenheim's post-Holocaust thought are seriously confused and mistaken.

Several mistakes are frequently made about Fackenheim's thinking. The first is that he is a philosopher and, for this reason, is more interested in the importance of philosophers and theologians, such as Hegel, Rosenzweig, Heidegger and Buber, than in concrete events and people. A second mistake is to

1 The Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums was German Jewry's first academic institution. It was devoted to a modern, scholarly study of Jewish subjects, what in today's universities might be called Jewish Studies, and had a Liberal rabbinical seminary as well. It existed from 1872 to 1942.

categorize Fackenheim as a traditional fideist, and as a narrow one, who thinks that, after Auschwitz, only those who believe in God can be Jews, that only such Jews can be authentic, and that everyone else lives somehow defective lives. Finally, many people believe that Fackenheim only began to think about the Holocaust after the Six Day War and the threat to the State of Israel and that it was this event that opened the door to his post-Holocaust theology. Thus, in this view, his post-Holocaust thought is essentially tied to a certain political approach to Israel and Zionism.<sup>2</sup>

A quick look at his books and major writings might lead the reader to believe that Fackenheim was spurred to think about the impact of the Holocaust and its importance by the Six Day War in June 1967. His major essay “Jewish Faith and the Holocaust: A Fragment” appeared in *Commentary* in August 1968. He gave the Charles Deems Lectures “God’s Presence in History” in New York, at New York University, in 1968, and they were published in 1970.<sup>3</sup> But one fact alone indicates that this judgment is implausible and that the main lines of his thinking in this period were already in place by June 1967. On Purim in 1967, which was March 26, Steven Schwarzschild, then editor of *Judaism*, convened a symposium in New York, at the annual meeting of the journal’s board and under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee, on the theme “Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future.” This was the first public occasion on which Fackenheim presented his formulation of the 614<sup>th</sup> commandment.

By March 1967, then, Fackenheim had begun to turn his thinking centrally to Auschwitz and how to confront it as a Jew. During that same year, he published in *Daedalus* a long essay entitled “On the Self-Exposure of Faith to the Modern-Secular World: Philosophical Reflections in the Light of Jewish

2 I want to thank Joshua Shaw for noting to me how widespread are the first two of these mistakes and for suggesting that I state them early, as a kind of framework for this account.

3 *God’s Presence in History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

Experience.”<sup>4</sup> The essay is framed as a response to various critical trends in Christian theology, from Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Harvey Cox to the “death of God” theologians then in vogue (Thomas Altizer, William Hamilton, Paul Van Buren), ending with a discussion of Buber’s “eclipse of God” and some final, tentative reflections on the Holocaust. In the course of the essay, he says that facing up to Auschwitz as “survival for survival’s sake is an inadequate stand.”<sup>5</sup> In the symposium piece of March 1967, and then later in the essay “Jewish Faith and the Holocaust” and in the introduction to *Quest for Past and Future*, he would say:

I confess I used to be highly critical of Jewish philosophies which seemed to advocate no more than survival for survival’s sake. I have changed my mind. I now believe that, in this present, unbelievable age, even a mere collective commitment to Jewish group-survival for its own sake is a momentous response, with the greatest implications.<sup>6</sup>

Some time, then, during the fall and winter of 1966–67, Fackenheim had changed his mind about the importance of a commitment to Jewish survival.<sup>7</sup> What had happened?

Here I want to make some educated guesses. The first is that

4 *Daedalus*, 96 (1967), pp. 193–219; also in *Religion in America*, edited by William G. McLoughlin and R.N. Bellah (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), pp. 203–229; and in Fackenheim’s collection *Quest for Past and Future* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), Chapter 18, pp. 278–305.

5 “On the Self-Exposure,” see *Quest for Past and Future*, p. 303.

6 “The 614<sup>th</sup> Commandment,” reprinted in *The Jewish Thought of Emil Fackenheim: A Reader*, edited by Michael Morgan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), p. 158.

7 In Fackenheim, *An Epitaph for German Judaism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming), Emil recalls that, at one of the Quebec meetings of the I. Meier Segals Center, Milton Himmelfarb, responding to someone who said that “mere survival” cannot be the “purpose” of either the Jewish people or Judaism, exploded: “After the Holocaust, let no one call Jewish survival ‘mere.’” (p. 151). Over the years, he cited this remark regularly; it is likely that Himmelfarb had made it at the meeting during the summer of 1966, or possibly at the next meeting in 1967.

nothing significant of a personal or historical nature occurred in the fall and winter of 1966–67 to generate his new commitment to facing Auschwitz. The Holocaust was *always present* in Fackenheim’s thinking, as a permanent perplexity and trauma, from his youth in Germany until those days in the fall and winter of 1966–67, when he turned to grappling with the dark time in utter and complete seriousness and devotion.<sup>8</sup> As later recollections would testify, he never forgot those of his family who were left behind, who never fled, who were lost, who died, who were killed — especially, I think, his older brother, Alexander, whom he always felt had been abandoned.

In a sense, I would say, Fackenheim always wanted to testify, to take a stand, to face up to Auschwitz, but psychologically and intellectually he could not. Something happened in the fall and winter of 1966–67 to change that. What was it?

Psychological issues aside, what did Fackenheim the philosopher and the Jew have in hand at that moment that gave him the resources to take the Holocaust with complete seriousness, in a way that he would not be belittling the memories of its victims? First, since the mid-1950s, and, indeed, even earlier, he had been at work on a project concerning faith and reason in German philosophy from Kant to Kierkegaard.<sup>9</sup> But, as Fackenheim would later note, the project reached an obstacle when he turned to Hegel, and he began to immerse himself in Hegel’s philosophy and the Hegelian system. By 1966–67, I think, he had come to understand the Hegelian system, its inner workings, and its coherence, and that meant he had come also to understand the relation in Hegel between historical reality and philosophical

8 Two indications are a radio talk on Nazism that Fackenheim gave when he was a rabbi in Hamilton, Ontario, in 1948, reprinted in *The Jewish Thought of Emil Fackenheim*, and the opening section of *Metaphysics and Historicity*, called “Ideological Fanaticism.”

9 The earliest prospectus for the project dates from the late 1940s. Essays on Kant and Schelling in the early 1950s are parts of it. The proposal for the Guggenheim Foundation in 1956 outlines it.

thought. On the other hand, he had come increasingly to believe that Hegel himself, had he lived during and after the Nazi destruction, the death camps, and the atrocities, would have seen in them an unprecedented and radical form of evil that would have defied Hegelian synthesis, i.e., assimilation into the philosophical thought that Hegelian philosophy represented as its highest form.<sup>10</sup>

Philosophically, then, Fackenheim had come to the conclusion that the threat posed by Auschwitz was radical. But if this were so, could there still be hope for the future?

Fackenheim often said, in later years, that what made possible the responsible and serious exposure to Auschwitz for Jews and for Jewish theologians like himself was the example of Elie Wiesel.<sup>11</sup> Wiesel, I believe, represented for Fackenheim and many of his theological colleagues the fact that faith had in actuality exposed itself to the horrors of the death camps and nonetheless had survived. The role that Wiesel played for Fackenheim, then, was not as a novelist per se but rather as a survivor and a reflective one who expressed his experiences of descent and of recovery fictionally. However, the central point is that Wiesel represented the perspective that resistance to the evil of Nazism, total as it was, was necessary and possible.

In “Jewish Faith and the Holocaust” and in the third chapter of *God’s Presence in History*, this conviction is articulated as

10 Fackenheim shows how prominent Hegel was in his thinking during this period when he discusses the existentialist critique of Hegel’s thinking and the “limits of the essence-approach,” as he calls it, and asks how a Jew today must respond to the “here-and-now” that includes “the events associated with the dread name of Auschwitz.” The discussion is in chapter 1 of *Quest for Past and Future*, “These Twenty Years: A Reappraisal,” published in 1968, pp. 15–17. The preface of the book is dated October 4, 1967; one can date the writing of this previously unpublished chapter during the summer and early fall of 1967, just after the Six Day War, to which it refers.

11 Fackenheim says this explicitly in the preface to the second edition of *To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. xvi: “One participant would be Elie Wiesel, the one writer then known to me who genuinely confronted Judaism with the Holocaust — and the Holocaust with Judaism.”

Fackenheim's claim that Auschwitz is "the rock on which throughout eternity all rational explanations will crash and break apart" and that "seeking a purpose is one thing, but seeking a response is another." Finally, after twenty years, he had come to what he calls a "momentous discovery: that while religious thinkers were vainly struggling for a response to Auschwitz, Jews throughout the world .... had to some degree been responding all along."<sup>12</sup> This "discovery" was the fulcrum on which the necessity and possibility of Jewish recovery and response turned. If response as resistance and recovery was actual, then it could be possible, and if possible, then we could "read off of existing responses" a set of norms or imperatives for how an authentic response ought to be conducted. This is the source — for those who now recognize it — of Fackenheim's 614th commandment, of its origin and its content.

This intellectual situation gave rise to a complex reflection on the role of the Holocaust for Jews, Christians, historians, Germans, and others, a reflection articulated most fully in those years in the third chapter of *God's Presence in History* and, to this day, poorly understood. The task that faced Fackenheim was manifold. First, to show how Auschwitz challenged all thought, how it was meaningless and without purpose and unexplainable; second, to show how the turn from thought to life — as he often put it, "thought must go to school with life" — pointed to the actuality of resistance; third, to derive from this actual resistance a conception of why continued resistance is necessary; fourth, to give some content to the norms or imperatives that might be used to express that necessity; fifth, to explain what the ground of that necessity is, what the force of the obligation is for believing and for secular Jews; and, finally, to say something about the possibility of our performing such obligations or imperatives.

The formulation of the 614<sup>th</sup> commandment occurs within this line of thinking and incorporates several of its steps, which is part

12 These quotations are from "Jewish Faith and the Holocaust," *The Jewish Thought of Emil Fackenheim*, pp. 163–164.

of what makes it so challenging and difficult to understand.<sup>13</sup> In it, Fackenheim is not doing one thing but rather many things at once. The commandment not to give Hitler any posthumous victories expresses the resistance of continued acts of faithfulness to Judaism and the Jewish people and to human dignity; it expresses that a believing Jew would take such acts to be responses to a commandment and that the source of the commandment's authority would be Divine. Moreover, the commandment as it is formulated and then interpretively expanded into its four parts is the outcome of how Fackenheim now — and those who would see things his way — would interpret the content of that resistance, i.e., the shape that such resistance and continued fidelity to Judaism and humanity would take.

Even in those years Fackenheim never held that all Jews must take the imperative to be a commandment or that all Jews must take it to be a Divine commandment. Secular Jews would not. For them there would be a sense of acting under an obligation even without an understanding of where it came from or what stood behind it, so to speak.

There is a sense in which every important step in Fackenheim's earlier thinking went through a deep exploration and reformulation in his magnum opus of 1982, *To Mend the World*.<sup>14</sup> But let me skip directly to its most decisive encounter with the evils of Auschwitz. The main issues are raised in the central chapter. There Fackenheim turns to an exploration of what he calls "resistance during the Holocaust" and then "resistance as an ontological category." What

13 In the preface to the second edition of *To Mend the World*, pp. xix–xx, Fackenheim discusses some of the problems raised by his formulation, problems he tried to deal with earlier in the writings of 1967–1970, but which had plagued discussions of him.

14 Fackenheim makes a point, in the Introduction to *To Mend the World*, and elsewhere, of distinguishing the book from *Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Philosophy* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 21–22, but I think the better framework for understanding the book's role is that developed in the late 1960s, especially in "Jewish Faith and the Holocaust" and the third chapter of *God's Presence in History*.

we have here is the deepest account Fackenheim gives of the evil of Auschwitz and the failure of all thought to understand or encompass it and, following that, his most sustained argument for the role and ground of resistance to that evil. The result of these two sections, sections 8 and 9 of chapter IV, is that resistance to Auschwitz and all it stands for was actual; it was necessary; and it was possible.

Whereas earlier, in *God's Presence in History* and the essays that preceded it, Fackenheim was concerned *with understanding the ground of the necessity or normative force of the imperative to resist or oppose Nazi purposes and with its articulation* — which occurs later as the filling in of the idea of *tikkun* — here his focus is on *the possibility of performing the obligation, of in fact continuing to live our lives as resisting actions*. To put it simply, resistance cannot be so easy for us today that it belittles those who did not exercise it in those days, nor can it be so hard today that it makes the resistance of those who performed it pointless, so that Hitler has indeed won his posthumous victories.<sup>15</sup>

Fackenheim is very explicit about the chief problem he felt in writing these sections of chapter IV. In the introduction to *To Mend the World*, he discusses how he had handled it earlier and why that treatment was inadequate.<sup>16</sup> Earlier he had used two strategies to understand how the imperative of resistance — or what he then called the 614<sup>th</sup> commandment — could be performed; that is, how

15 I believe that Fackenheim's basic problem is akin to what Eliezer Berkovits calls the situation of "Job's brothers," referring to all of us today who seek to respond to Auschwitz and to our Jewish situation. Our faith cannot be so easy to maintain that it demeans those who lost it in the death camps, nor can it be so hard to maintain that it degrades the simple faith of those who kept it. There are tremendous differences between the two, Fackenheim and Berkovits, concerning their outcomes and also the character of their systematic thinking, but still the dialectical way that Berkovits characterizes authentic post-Holocaust faith does bear a similarity to what Fackenheim requires of a genuine post-Holocaust resistance. Fackenheim himself emphasizes the problem of the possibility of performing the imperative in his preface to the second edition of *To Mend the World*, pp. xx–xxii.

16 *To Mend the World*, pp. 24–28.

it was possible to follow it. One strategy was to follow Kant, who argued that ought implies can, that morality requires freedom. To say that the command to oppose Nazi purposes existed was to say that those for whom it existed were free to act on it. Another, more theological, strategy was to follow Rosenzweig, who had argued that God, in giving the commandments, also gave us the freedom to follow them.

Fackenheim, however, came to see that, by calling upon either strategy, one was demeaning all those victims who did not resist and belittling all those who did. Most of all, as he came to see, such responses are “glib” and reveal how inadequately he had immersed himself in the dark world called Auschwitz.<sup>17</sup> He calls attention to the *Musselmänner*, whom he had come to see — following Primo Levi — were the characteristic products of the death camps, and asks, “Who dares assert that, had he been then and there rather than here and now, he would not have been reduced to a Musselmann?” No account of how it is *possible* to accept the burden of an imperative of resistance today is genuine and responsible if it rules out the possibility that one could be overwhelmed, dehumanized, and annihilated. To be honest to the victims requires being absolutely honest about what happened to them.

But this might seem to lead to a dead end. If we look hard enough at Auschwitz, we see only a “midnight of dark despair.” If the evil was that overwhelming and complete, why is it not total? At the time of writing *To Mend the World*, Fackenheim believed that he could see, as he put it, a “shining light” in that dark night. In the event itself, even if it was “irresistible,” it was being resisted, and by locating that resistance, analyzing it and clarifying it, he could find a ground for the possibility of our responding today to that horror then (and to our own horrors today). The figure he was looking for was a lucid, transparent act of resistance, and he found it in the life and then the writings of Pelagia Lewinska, a Polish noblewoman, whose acts of resistance and whose struggles for

17 Ibid., pp. 24–25.

dignity in Auschwitz were illuminated by a clear and focused understanding of the purposes of those who had assaulted her and of the entire world of which it was a part.<sup>18</sup>

In a sense, then, Fackenheim came to this answer to his central question: it is possible for us to resist Nazi purposes now, because resistance was actual then in a way that it understood itself as the victim of radical evil and yet as acts of resistance against it. This, I think, coupled with the unique role of *tikkun* as the concept that facilitates our understanding of the modes of resistance that follow, is the central teaching of Fackenheim's magnum opus, or, at least, its central teaching with regard to the Holocaust. It provides a foundation, he argues, for future Jewish thought and life and for understanding how others — Germans, Americans, and Israelis, historians, psychologists, and ordinary people — might seek to articulate the demands and possibilities for their lives.

Fackenheim's thought represents no false or facile optimism. It is a hard-won realism, as it were, that refuses to allow the evil total dominion even while it refuses to mitigate it. Among those who have reflected on these matters, he alone, I believe, has tried to hold together what look like incommensurable affirmations, to acknowledge the dark midnight for what it was and what it can be, and yet to find reason for hope.

The ways in which that hope can be and might be expressed are varied and diverse. Fackenheim, I think, was wise enough in the late 1960s to accept many types of responses — from Jews, “rich and poor, learned and ignorant, religious and nonreligious,” from non-Jews, Christians, Germans, scholars and intellectuals, and from ordinary people. He never wavered in the commitment to this variety and did come to regret his use of the Heideggerian and

18 See Pelagia Lewinska's memoir, *Twenty Months at Auschwitz* (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1968). The memoir was originally published in 1945 in Polish and French.

perhaps “elitist” terminology of “authenticity” to mark it.<sup>19</sup> Fackenheim always was committed to a spectrum of response, all of which has some degree of integrity and nobility about it.

It would not be wholly wrong to say that Fackenheim’s post-Holocaust philosophy and thought have two peaks, *God’s Presence in History* and *To Mend the World*. In these works, most of all, the most profound and fundamental issues are addressed and developed. These issues concern the necessity of confronting the Holocaust with honesty and seriousness and then both the necessity and possibility of going on after it. Once these twin necessities are in place, the task becomes one of articulating, for a host of groups and types of respondents, how that “going on” might take shape. This task regularly involves reaching into the past to recover what one can, but to do so only through the “shadows” or the “darkness” of the Holocaust. One might call this task, which takes up much of Fackenheim’s work of the 1970s, and then again virtually all of what he writes after *To Mend the World*, a “hermeneutic of recovery.”

In the 1970s, the work takes place in essays, lectures, and talks, and is largely done from a Jewish point of view. Nevertheless, often it is not only about a Jewish response but also, for example, about a Christian one; it is topical and regularly emphasizes the special role of Israel for that recovery. Much of it is collected in *The Jewish Return into History*, published in 1978,<sup>20</sup> at the very time he was working on *To Mend the World*.

After his magnum opus was published in 1982, the remainder of Fackenheim’s career, I believe, can be understood as a multi-

19 Opposition to this idea of calling for a single and high standard of response is at the center of Michael André Bernstein’s criticism of Fackenheim in *Foregone Conclusions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 44. I think that Bernstein’s attention to the terminology of authenticity misleads him to think that Fackenheim is legislating Jewish behavior and ruling out much of it as serious and honest. As I have tried to point out, I do not think this was ever true of Fackenheim, when he is read correctly.

20 *The Jewish Return into History: Reflections in the Age of Auschwitz and a New Jerusalem* (New York: Schocken, 1978).

faceted investment in this task of a hermeneutics of recovery. He already begins that task, of course, in *To Mend the World*, after the notion of *tikkun olam* is introduced, for philosophy, Christianity, and Jewish existence.<sup>21</sup> His next book, *What Is Judaism?*, is an extended version of this hermeneutic for Judaism, written, as he says in the introduction, for *amcha*, and covering all of the central dimensions of Jewish existence. The book is very much an attempt to characterize Judaism in a post-Holocaust world, although, unlike his earlier essays, Fackenheim does not place Auschwitz in the foreground, nor does he summarize the thinking about response from the period of *God's Presence in History* as he had regularly done in the 1970s. Rather he focuses on precise themes and topics — chosenness, ritual, revelation, messianism, ethics, and more — and reinterprets them in very personal terms, while allowing the Holocaust to shape that reinterpretation in a more indirect and implicit way.<sup>22</sup> His next book, *The Jewish Bible after the Holocaust*, based on lectures first given at Manchester University, is about reading the Bible after Auschwitz and particularly about how a Jewish-Christian dialogue about the Bible might be orchestrated.<sup>23</sup>

The final pages of this book on a post-Holocaust re-reading of the Bible already disclose a new and important dimension of Fackenheim's hermeneutic of recovery, a dimension that would become increasingly prominent for him in the 1990s, and, indeed, until his death. That dimension concerns German Christians and their response to their horrific past, to the Jewish people, to Judaism, and to Israel. Indeed, if there are two primary foci of Fackenheim's attention during his last decade, it is Israel, on the

21 See sections 12–14 of chapter IV.

22 *What Is Judaism? An Interpretation for the Present Age* (New York: Summit Books, 1987).

23 The Sherman Lectures were originally given at Manchester University in November 1987; the book was published in 1990, by Manchester University Press. Its final chapter on Jewish-Christian dialogue focused on the Bible and its appendix are both supplements to the original lectures.

one hand, and German Christians, on the other. From his first major post-Holocaust essay, “Jewish Faith and the Holocaust: A Fragment,” he had spoken powerfully about how Auschwitz had brought Jews and Christians together in new and different ways and, at the same time, had torn them apart. Circumstances in the late 1980s and 1990s brought him together with a new group of Christians. These were Germans who were seeking to face their past and grapple with their present and future, and Fackenheim became their teacher — first in Israel, and then in Germany itself.

With regard to Israel, he had lectured and written in the 1970s, arguing that Israel’s commitment to secular self-reliance and religious hope was emblematic of the dual character of all genuine responses to Auschwitz. In essays such as “Israel and the Holocaust: Their Interrelation” he had argued for Israel’s messianic and political role as a response to the threat of annihilation during the Holocaust. Later he would argue for the centrality, in light of this role, of the Law of Return and of the unconditionality of Israel’s existence as a state in the Land of Israel, the Jewish homeland. These, he would claim, are the pillars of a responsible and serious post-Holocaust Zionism.<sup>24</sup> It was a Zionism conceived without flourish, in a very precise historical, religious, and political situation, he believed, one that would unavoidably be

24 See “Pillars of Zionism,” *Midstream* (December 1992), 13–15; reprinted in Michael L. Morgan, ed., *Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), chapter 17. Especially in the 1990s, he wrote frequently on political and military incidents and affairs, in letters to the editor, newspaper columns, and other occasional pieces. For this Fackenheim was regularly criticized by many, in part for what appeared to be his conservatism and extremism, in part for what seemed his failure to understand fully the political and military situation given his restricted access to information and what seemed like political naïveté, and in part for his apparent insensitivity to the Palestinian problem and his resistance to any kind of accommodation. It is arguable, however, that he saw the fundamental issues about what Zionism needed to be and also understood full well the political and military situation but adhered to a kind of realism about politics, akin to what one finds in an intellectual and statesman like Connor Cruise O’Brien, a person for whom he had the greatest respect.

burdened and conflicted in its existential implementation. As he put it at the end of an essay on the State of Israel:

The realm of the political exists where there is power, and where there is power there is conflict and fear. The political is therefore a burden, as is political philosophy. One would wish to be rid of both.... The burden must be borne. Even in bearing it, however, one may be sustained by the transpolitical vision of all nations flowing to Jerusalem, of each sitting under his vine and fig tree, with none to make them afraid.<sup>25</sup>

In short, in his last years, Fackenheim turned his hermeneutics of recovery to Germany, to Christians, and to Israel as threatened and embattled, and he sought, in articles and eventually in the memoirs on which he worked for years but never saw published, to clarify what shape self-exposure to Auschwitz and a recovery in the future might take.

In these comments I have sought to clarify several features of Emil Fackenheim's thinking about the Holocaust. I have hoped to show how badly mistaken are the misreadings I mentioned earlier: Fackenheim's encounter with the Holocaust was a life-long matter, not one that began in June 1967. He was not an abstract philosopher but a thinker whose thought was always responsive to the lived experiences of people. Furthermore, his post-Holocaust thought is open and sensitive to the nobility of an extraordinary spectrum of ways of living our lives after Auschwitz; there is in his work a remarkable sensitivity to Jews and non-Jews, to the strong and the weak, and to many others. Fackenheim's works deserve the most careful study; they constitute an extraordinary legacy to us as we, like he, seek to understand the meaning of Jewish existence today and in the future.

25 "A Political Philosophy for the State of Israel: Fragments," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* (1988), pp. 1-18; reprinted in Morgan, ed., *Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy*, chapter 16.